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This is a report about comparative study of the propostional intutionis-
tic (non-modal) and classical modal languages interpreted in the standard
way in transitive frames. Talking about transitive frames, the intution-
isitc language displays some unusual features: its expressive power be-
comes weaker than that of the modal language, the induced consequence
relation does not have a deduction theorem and etc. We develops a man-
ageable model theory for this consequence relation and its extensions
which also reveals some unexpected phenomena. The balance between
the intuitionistic and modal language is restore by adding to the former
one more implication. This report is an extended abstract of [7].
1. Both modal and intuitionistic propositional languages may be re-
garded as talking about quasi-order $\mathcal{F}=\langle W, R\rangle,$ $R$ a reflexive and transi-
tive relation on a set $W$ . The primitive operators of the modal language
$\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ are $\wedge,$ $,$ $arrow,$ $\perp \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\square$ . The primitive operators of the intuitionisitic
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language $\mathcal{L}$ are same to the modal language without $\square$ . They are inter-
preted on quasi-order in usual way. For instance, $\square ,$ $arrow \mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}arrow \mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}$
$\mathcal{L}$ are defined as follows if we denote truth-relation as $\models$ ;
the case of $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$
$x\models\square \varphi$ iff $\forall y\in W.(_{XR}y\Rightarrow y\models\varphi)$
$x\models\varphiarrow\psi$ iff $x\models\varphi$ implies $x\models\varphi$
the case of $\mathcal{L}$
$x\models\varphiarrow\psi$ iff $\forall y\in W.(XRy\wedge y\models\varphi\Rightarrow y\models\psi)$
The intuitionistic lanugage $\mathcal{L}$ may be evaluated on the set Up$W=\{X\subseteq$
$W$ : $\forall x,$ $y$ ($x\in X$ A $xRy\Rightarrow y\in X$ ) $\}$ of cones (or upward closed sets). That
means, for any intuitionisitic formulas, if the truth-sets $\mathcal{V}(\varphi)$ is defined
as the set $\{x\in W : x\models\varphi\},$ $\mathcal{V}(\varphi)\in \mathrm{U}\mathrm{p}W$ holds. Intuitionistic formulas
cannot distinguish between points in the same cluster $C(x)=\{x\}\cup\{y\in$
$W$ : $xRy$ A $yRx$ }, however,as far as only cones are concerned, the modal
and intuitionistic languages are of the same expressive power at both
functional (local) and axiomatic (global) levels.
Let fix a quasi-order $\mathcal{F}=\langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{R}\rangle$ , and suppose $\mathcal{V}$ is a valuation on
$F$ and $\varphi(p_{1}, \ldots , p_{n})$ is any $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}-$ and $\mathcal{L}$-formula where variables occuring
in the list $p_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $p_{n}$ . We define a $n$-ary operator $\hat{\varphi}_{\mathcal{F}}(X_{1}, \ldots , X_{n})$ as the
function $\hat{\varphi}_{F}(\mathcal{V}(p_{1}), \ldots , \mathcal{V}(p_{n}))=\mathcal{V}(\varphi)$ . $\varphi_{F}$ is equal to $\hat{\varphi}_{\mathcal{F}}$ if $\varphi$ is $\mathcal{L}$-formula.
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If $\varphi$ is $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$-formula,
$\varphi_{F}=\{$
$\hat{\varphi}_{F}$ if $\hat{\varphi}f(x_{1}, \ldots, X_{n})\in \mathrm{U}\mathrm{p}W$ for all $X_{1},$ $\ldots$ , $X_{n}\in \mathrm{U}\mathrm{p}W$
$\overline{\perp}_{F}$ otherwise.
Proposition 1 For any quasi-order $\mathcal{F},$ $\{\varphi_{F} : \varphi\in \mathcal{L}\}=\{\varphi_{f} : \varphi\in \mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}\}$ .
Proof One direction $(\subseteq)$ is easy by using G\"odel translation. See [4]. For
the converse direction, see Lemmas 8.32 and 8.33 in [4]. a
A class $C$ of quasi-order is said to be $\mathcal{L}-$ (or $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}-$) axiomatic if there is a
set $\Gamma$ of $\mathcal{L}-$ (respectively, $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}-$) formulas such that, for every quasi-order
$\mathcal{F},$ $F\models\Gamma$ iff $\mathcal{F}\in C.$ ( $\mathcal{F}\models\Gamma$ means that all formulas in $\Gamma$ are true at
all points in $\mathcal{F}$ under all possible valuations.) Since $\mathcal{L}$-formulas do not
distinguish between points in one cluster, when comparing the axiomatic
power of modal and intuitionistic formulas we should consider skelton-
closed frame classes. Here, a class of frames is skelton-closed if with
every $\mathcal{F}$ contains also all the quasi-order whose skeltons are isomprphic
to the skelton of $\mathcal{F}$ . We define a skelton of quasi-order $\mathcal{F}=\langle W, R\rangle$ as
$\mathcal{F}^{\mathrm{o}}=\langle W^{\mathrm{O}}, R^{\circ}\rangle$ where $W^{\mathrm{O}}=\{C(x) : x\in W\}$ and $C(x)R^{\mathrm{o}_{C}}(y)$ iff $xRy$ .
Proposition 2 A skeleton-closed class $C$ of quasi-orders is $\mathcal{L}$ -axiomatic
iff it is $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ -axiomatic.
Proof The deduction from the assumpotion a class is $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ –axiomatic
to it is $\mathcal{L}$-axiomatic, see [11]. The converse direction is easy. a
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Example 3 The class of all partial orders without infinite $s\mathrm{t}$rictly as-
cending chains is $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ -axiomatic; it is axiomatizable by the Grzegorczyk
formula $(^{-}$ but not $\mathcal{L}_{-a}Xiomati_{C}f$ it is not skeleton-
closed.
Between $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{L}$ , there is te fact that the G\"odel translation $\mathrm{T}$
embeds extensions of intuitionisitic logic Int into extensions of classical
modal logic S4. We denote the class of extensions of Int known as super-
intuitionistic or intermediate logics (si-logics, for short) as $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ , and
smallest si-logic containig a set of $\mathcal{L}$-formulas $\Gamma$ as $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}+\Gamma$ . Each si-logic
contains Int, and is closed under modus ponens $(\mathrm{M}\mathrm{P})$ and substituition
(Subst). $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{S}4$ is the class of normal extensions of S4 which are sets of
$\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$-formulas containing S4 and closed under Subst, MP and necessita-
tion. $\mathrm{S}4\oplus\Gamma$ is the smallest normal extension of S4 to contain $\Gamma\subseteq \mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ .
Define a map $\rho$ : $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}4\mapsto \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ and $\tau,$ $\sigma$ : $\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}-\succ \mathrm{N}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}4$ by
taking, for any $M\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{S}4$ and $L\in \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ ,
$\rho M=\{\varphi\in \mathcal{L} : \mathrm{T}\varphi\in M\}$ ,
$\tau L=$ S4 $\oplus\{\mathrm{T}:\varphi\in L\}$ ,
$\sigma L=\tau L\oplus$ .
(Detailed properties the above mapings, for instance, see [4].)
$\square$ of S4 can be understand as denoting informal provability. As con-
trasted with S4, the fact $\square$ of GL denotes formal provability in Peano
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arithmetic is.. well known. Using $\mathrm{T}^{+}$ , we can get embedding of Int into
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{L}$ , where $\mathrm{T}^{+}(\varphi)$ replaces every $\psi$ in $\mathrm{T}(\varphi)$ by $\varphi=\varphi\wedge^{-}$ . Visser [8]
described $\rho \mathrm{G}\mathrm{L}$ and $\rho \mathrm{K}4$ (K4 is the modal logic of all transitive frames)
in the form of natural deduction systems.
Ruitenburg [6], criticizing the BHK interpretation of Int for not ex-
plaining the logical connectives in simpler terms, proposed to interpret
implication as “a proof of $\varphiarrow\psi$ is a construction that uses the assump-
tion $\varphi$ to produce a proof of $\psi$”. And he shows that his proof interpre-
tation gives rise not to Int but a weaker logic which is characterized by
the class of arbitrary transitive (not necessary reflexive) frames.
Our aims are to clarify how far the relation ship between $\mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$
considered above can be extended on the class of frames which relation is
traisitive, and to find a suitable non-modal propositional language which
could talk about transitive frames as fulently as $\mathcal{L}$ can talk about quasi-
orders.
2. From now on by a (Kripke) frame we mean a pari $\mathcal{F}=\langle W, R\rangle$ in
which $R$ is a transitive relation on a set $W\neq\emptyset.\mathrm{A}$ model of the language
$\mathcal{L}$ is a pair $\mathcal{M}=\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ , where $\mathcal{F}$ is a frame and $\mathcal{V}$ maps propositional
variables into $\mathrm{U}\mathrm{p}W$ . The truth-relation $\models \mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}$ A4 is same to the case for
Int. $\mathcal{M}\models\varphi,$ $\varphi$ is true in $\mathcal{M}$ , means that $x\models\varphi$ for every $x\in W$ , and
$\mathcal{F}\models\varphi,$
$\varphi$ is valid in $F$ , that $\varphi$ is true in every model on $\mathcal{F}$ .
From this definition, $\mathrm{T}arrow\perp(\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{S}\perparrow\perp)$ is true at every final
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irreflexive point in any model holds. As for the expressive power, the
following propositions hold.
Proposition 4 For all frame $\mathcal{F},$ $\{\varphi_{F} : \varphi\in \mathcal{L}\}\subset\{\varphi_{\mathcal{F}} : \varphi\in \mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}\}$.
Proof Suppose translation $\mathrm{T}’$ which prefixes $\square$ to every subformula of
varphi of the form $\psiarrow\chi$ . To show proper inclusion holds, consider the
frame $\mathcal{F}=\langle\{a, b\}, \emptyset\rangle$ and $p$.
Proposition 5 The class 2 of all quasi-orders is $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ -axiomatic but not
$\mathcal{L}$ -axiomatic.
Proof $\mathcal{F}\in Q$ iff $\mathcal{F}\models\square parrow p$ . On the other hand, every $\mathcal{L}$-formula
$\varphi\in$ Int (and even $\varphi\in$ Cl) is valid also in the frame $\langle\{a\}, \emptyset\rangle$ , as is
easily shown by induction on the construction of $\varphi$ . So if $Q$ would be
axiomatizable by a set of $\mathcal{L}$-formulas $\Gamma$ then $\Gamma\subseteq$ Int and consequently
$\langle\{a\}, \emptyset\rangle\in Q$ , which is a contradiction. $\square$
Let us consider now the set V $=\{\varphi\in \mathcal{L} : \forall \mathcal{F}\mathcal{F}\models\varphi\}$ . According
to the completeness theorem of Visser [8], V coincides with the set of
formulas derivable in the basic propositional logic BPL represented by
Visser in the form of a natural deduction system.
To compare V with the standard axiomatization of Int, we just cite
here the following observation from [8].
Proposition 6 V is closed under substitution and modus ponens, and
contains all the axioms of Int in [4] except $(parrow(qarrow r))arrow((parrow q)arrow$
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$(parrow r))$ .
Semantically the consequence relation $\vdash_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}}$ in intuitionistic logic can
be defined as “$\Gamma\vdash_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}}$ iff $\forall \mathcal{M}\forall x((\mathcal{M}, X)\models\Gamma\Rightarrow(\mathcal{M}, x)\models\varphi)$”, $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathcal{M}$
ranges over intuitionistic models and $x$ over points in $\mathcal{M}$ . As was shown
by Visser [8], th.e relation $\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ defined by “$\Gamma\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ iff $\forall \mathcal{M}\forall x((\mathcal{M}, X)\models$
$\Gamma\Rightarrow(\mathcal{M}, x)\models\varphi)$”, $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathcal{M}$ ranges over all transitive models, is the
consequence relation of his natural deduction system for V.
Now, considering $\langle \mathcal{L}, \vdash_{\mathrm{V}}\rangle$ as a deductive system, we see that modus
ponens is nota derivable rule in it. Moreover,
Proposition 7 There exists no formula $\chi(p, q)$ such that,for all $\Gamma,$ $\varphi,$ $\psi$ ,
$\mathrm{r},$ $\psi\vdash_{\mathrm{v}\varphi}$ iff $\Gamma\vdash_{\mathrm{V}x}(\psi, \varphi)$ .
Proof Assume on contrary. Take $\Gamma$ as $\{\mathrm{T}arrow\perp\},\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ derive the contra-
diction. $\square$
3. The Kripke semantics we considered in the previous section is not
enough for dealing with extensions of V. An algebraic sematics for V was
introduced by Ardeshir and Ruitenburg [2]. The aim of this section is
to define a notion of a general frame for V and develop to some extent
duality theory for the algebraic and relational semantics.
We can get an impression how algebras for V may look like by rep-
resenting transitive frames $\mathcal{F}=\langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{R}\rangle$ as the algebras of cones $\mathcal{F}^{+}=$
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$\langle \mathrm{U}\mathrm{p}W, \cap, \cup, arrow, \emptyset, W\rangle$ in which
$Xarrow \mathrm{Y}=\{x\in W : \forall y(xRy\wedge y\in X\Rightarrow y\in \mathrm{Y})\}$ (1)
(the logical connectives $\wedge,$ $,$ $arrow,$ $\perp,$ $\mathrm{T}$ are interpreted in $\mathcal{F}^{+}$ by the
operations $\cap,$ $\cup,$ $arrow,$ $\emptyset,$ $W$ , respectively). Every such algebra is clearly
a bounded (i.e., with top and bottom) distributive lattice satisfying the
following equations ($a\leq b$ means $a\wedge b=a$):
$aarrow b\wedge c=(aarrow b)\wedge(aarrow c)$ ;
$b\vee carrow a=(barrow a)\wedge(carrow a)$ ;
$aarrow a=\mathrm{T}$ and $a\leq \mathrm{T}arrow a$ ;
$(aarrow b)\wedge(barrow c)\leq aarrow c$.
Let us take these properties as a definition and call a bounded distributive
lattice $A=\langle A, \wedge, \mathrm{v}, arrow, \perp, \mathrm{T}\rangle$ satisfying the equations above a V-algebra.
Our goal now is to show that all $\mathrm{V}$-algebras are induced by frames, are
subalgebras of the corresponding algebras of cones, to be more exact. To
this end we require the following lemma on the existence of prime filters
in V-algebras.
Lemma 8 Suppose $A=\langle A,$ $\wedge,$ $\mathrm{v},$ $arrow,$ $\perp,$ $\mathrm{T}^{\backslash }/$ is a $\mathrm{V}$ -algebra, $\nabla$ a prime




$\ldots$ , $d_{n}\in DC_{1^{\wedge}}\ldots\wedge c_{m}arrow d_{1^{}}\ldots\vee dn\not\in\nabla$ .
Then there exists a prime filter $\nabla’$ in $A$ such that $C\subseteq\nabla’,$ $\nabla’\cap D=\emptyset$
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and $\nabla R\nabla’$ , where
$\nabla R\nabla’$ iff $\forall a,$ $b\in A(aarrow b\in\nabla\wedge a\in\nabla’\Rightarrow b\in\nabla’)$ .
Theorem 9 All subalgebras of algebras of the form $\mathcal{F}^{+},$ $F$ a transitive
frame, comprise (up to isomorphism) the variety (equational class) of
V-algebras.
Proof When we prove closeness of the $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}arrow$ (defined by (1)), use
lemma 8. $\square$
Following the standard model-theoretic terminology of modal logic, we
call a general $\mathrm{V}$ -frame any structure $\mathcal{F}=\langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{R}, P\rangle$ where $\langle W, R\rangle$ is a
Kripke frame and $P$ a set of $R$-cones containing $\emptyset$ and closed $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\cap,$ $\cup$
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}arrow \mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ by (1). If $P=\mathrm{U}\mathrm{p}W$ , we call $F$ a Kripke frame as before
and may not mention $P$ explicitly. The dual of $\mathcal{F}$ , denoted by $\mathcal{F}^{+}$ , is the
subalgebra of $\langle W, R\rangle^{+}$ with domain $P$ .
Theorem 10 A general $\mathrm{V}$ -frame $\mathcal{F}=\langle W, R, P\rangle$ is isomorphic to $(\mathcal{F}^{+})_{+}$
iff $\mathcal{F}$ is descriptive in the sense that
$\bullet$ $x=y$ iff $\forall X\in P(x\in X\Leftrightarrow y\in X)_{i}$
$\bullet$ $xRy$ iff $\forall X,$ $\mathrm{Y}\in P(x\in Xarrow \mathrm{Y}\wedge y\in X\Rightarrow y\in \mathrm{Y})_{j}$
$\bullet$ $\langle W, P\rangle$ is compact, $i.e.$ , for all $\mathcal{X}\subseteq P$ and $\mathcal{Y}\subseteq\{W-X : X\in P\},$ if
$\mathcal{X}\cup \mathcal{Y}$ has the finite intersection property $then\cap(\mathcal{X}\cup \mathcal{Y})\neq\emptyset$ .




Example 11 Two examples of descriptive $\mathrm{V}$ -frames are shown in Fig. 1.
The frame $\mathcal{F}=\langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{P}\rangle$ on the lefl consists of two irreflexive points
(represented by $\bullet$) which do not see each other; all the cones in the set $P$
of possible values, save $W$ and $\emptyset_{f}$ are indicated explicitly by curve lines.
Arrows in the second frame $\mathcal{G}$ define its accessibility relation. It may be of
interest to notice that although these frames are finite, they are not Kripke
frames ($i.e.$ , their sets of possible values do not contain all cones), which
contrasts with the standard case of frames for modal and intuitionistic
logics.
Although V and $\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ are characterized by the variety of V-algebras,
the connection between algebraic properties of this variety and the con-
sequence relation $\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ is not as close as it is between, say, intuitionistic
logic and Heyting algebras. For instance, almost all non-pathological
propositional logics are protoalgebraic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi
[3]. However, as we show below, this is not the case $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ .
Roughly speaking, a consequence $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{0}\mathrm{n}\vdash \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ protoalgebraic if there is
a close connection between designated elements and congruences in ma-
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trices $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\vdash$ . A syntactic definition looks like this. Say that two formulas
$\alpha$ and $\beta$ are $\Gamma$-equivalent relative $to\vdash \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}$, for every formula $\gamma$ and every
variable $p$ occurring on $\gamma,$ “$\Gamma\vdash\gamma(\alpha/p)$ iff $\Gamma\vdash\gamma(\beta/p).$ ” Formulas $\alpha$ and
$\beta$ are $\Gamma$-interderivable relative $to\vdash \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}$ “ $\Gamma,$ $\alpha\vdash\beta$ iff $\Gamma,$ $\beta\vdash\alpha.$” Finally, $\vdash \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$
called protoalgebraic if, for $\mathrm{e}$.very set of formulas $\Gamma$ , any two formulas are
$\Gamma$-interderivable relative $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}\vdash \mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{V}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ they are $\Gamma$-equivalent relative to
$\vdash$ .
Theorem $12\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ is not protoalgebraic.
Proof We use the following algebraic characterization of protoalgebraic
consequence relations. Consider a matrix $\mathrm{M}=(A, D)$ , i.e., an algebra
$A$ together with a subset $D$ of the domain $A$ of A. $\mathrm{M}$ is a matrix for a
consequence relation $\vdash$ if $\mathcal{V}(\Gamma)\subseteq D$ implies $\mathcal{V}(\varphi)\in D$ whenever $\Gamma\vdash\varphi$
and $\mathcal{V}$ is a valuation in $A$ . By $\Omega D$ we denote the largest congruence
relation in $A$ which respects $D$ , i.e., such that $(a, b)\in\Omega D$ implies $a\in D$
iff $b\in D$ . Blok and Pigozzi [3] showed that a consequence relation $\vdash$ is
protoalgebraic iff $D_{1}\subseteq D_{2}$ implies $\Omega D_{1}\subseteq\Omega D_{2}$ whenever $(A, D_{1})$ and
$(A, D_{2})$ are matrices for $\vdash$ . Consider now the matrices $(\mathcal{F}^{+}, \{\mathrm{T}\})$ and
$(\mathcal{F}^{+}, \{\mathrm{T}, a\})$ , where $\mathcal{F}$ is the frame defined in Example 11. Clearly, both
of them are matrices $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ . It is easily verified that $\Omega\{\mathrm{T}\}$ identifies only
$a$ and $\perp \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\Omega\{\mathrm{T}, a\}$ only $\mathrm{T}$ and $a$ . Hence $\Omega\{\mathrm{T}\}\not\subset\Omega\{\mathrm{T}, a\}$ , and $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\vdash \mathrm{v}$
is not protoalgebraic. $\square$
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4. When we consider about the extensions of V, we encounter the
problem what kind of extensions are worth considering is. As we observed
in proposition 4, the class of quasi-order is not $\mathcal{L}$-axiomatic, we cannot
introduce formula extension, like $\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{X}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ , as a set of formulas $L$ that
contains $V$ and is closed under Subst $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ (that means $\varphi\in L$ if $\Gamma\subseteq L$
and $\Gamma\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}\psi$ ).
So we consider that extensions not of the logic V but of the conse-
quence relation $\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ . The most general class of such extensions consists
of arbitrary finitary (i.e., if $\Gamma\vdash\varphi$ then $\triangle\vdash\varphi$ for some finite $\triangle\subseteq\Gamma$ )
structural (i.e., closed under substitution) consequence relations contain-
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ . Each of them can be looked at as the result of adding $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ a set
$—\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}$ inference rules. Let $\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}+---\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}$ the smallest finitary structural
consequence relation containing $\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ and respecting the rules in $\cup--$ . For
instance, $\vdash \mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}=\vdash \mathrm{V}+\frac{p,parrow q}{q}$ and $\vdash_{\mathrm{F}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}}=\vdash_{\mathrm{v}}+\frac{(\mathrm{T}arrow p)arrow \mathrm{T}}{\mathrm{T}arrow p}$. The tau-
tologies that are deduced $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}\vdash_{\mathrm{F}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}}$ coincide with $\rho \mathrm{G}\mathrm{L}$ (FPC stands for
“formal propositional calculus”).
We say that a consequence $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{0}\mathrm{n}\vdash \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ a $\mathrm{V}$-consequence if it is finitary
and characterized by a class $\mathcal{F}\mathcal{R}$ of general $\mathrm{V}$-frames in the sense $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\vdash$
coincides with the relation $\models_{F\mathcal{R}}$ such that $\Gamma\models\tau \mathcal{R}\varphi$ iff for any model $\mathcal{M}$
based on a frame in $\mathcal{F}\mathcal{R}$ and any point $x$ in $\mathcal{M},$ $(\mathcal{M}, x)\models\Gamma\Rightarrow(\mathcal{M}, x)\models$
$\varphi$ . The class $\{\mathcal{F}:\vdash\subseteq\models_{\mathcal{F}}\}$ of frames $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\vdash \mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}$ be denoted by $\mathrm{F}\mathrm{r}\vdash$ .
The corresponding notions for $\mathrm{V}$-algebras can be defined as follows.
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For a class $A\mathcal{L}$ of $\mathrm{V}$-algebras we write $\Gamma\models_{A\mathcal{L}}\varphi$ iff there exists a finite
subset $\Gamma’$ of $\Gamma$ such that the $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}\wedge\Gamma’\leq\varphi$ is valid in all members of
$A\mathcal{L}$ . The class $\{A:\vdash\subseteq\models_{A}\}$ of algebras $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\vdash \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ denoted by $\mathrm{A}\vdash$ . Then,
Theorem 13 (i) A class of $\mathrm{V}$ -algebras is of the form Alg $\vdash for$ $a$ V-
$conSequence\vdash iff$ it is a subvariety of the variety of all V-algebras.
(ii) A class of general $\mathrm{V}$ -frames is of the form $\mathrm{F}\mathrm{r}\vdash for$ a V-consequence
$\vdash iff$ it is closed under generated subframes, reductions, disjoint unions
and it $a\mathit{8}$ well as its complement are closed under the formation of biduals.
Proof (i) Let $A\mathcal{L}=\mathrm{A}\vdash$ , for a $\mathrm{V}- \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{e}\vdash$. Then $A\mathcal{L}$ is the class
of $\mathrm{V}$-algebras defined by the equations { $\wedge\Gamma\leq\varphi$ : $\Gamma\vdash\varphi,$ $\Gamma$ is finite}
and so $A\mathcal{L}$ is a variety. Conversely, given a variety $A\mathcal{L}$ contained in the
variety of $\mathrm{V}$-algebras, one can easily check that Alg $\models_{A\mathcal{L}}$ coincides with
$A\mathcal{L}$ .
(ii) The closure conditions for classes of the form $\mathrm{F}\mathrm{r}\vdash \mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}$ clear. Con-
versely, assume that $\mathcal{F}R$ is a class of general $\mathrm{V}$-frames closed under gen-
erated subframes, reductions, disjoint unions and it as well as its comple-
ment are closed under the formation of biduals. First we show that $\models_{AL}$
is finitary. To this end suppose that $\Gamma’\# A\mathcal{L}\varphi$ , for every finite subset
$\Gamma’$ of a set of formulas $\Gamma$ . Take for each such $\Gamma’$ a frame $\mathcal{F}\in \mathcal{F}\mathcal{R}$ refut-
ing $\Gamma’\vdash\varphi$ and form the disjoint union $\mathcal{G}$ of all those $\mathcal{F}$ . Then in view
of the compactness of the descriptive frame $(\mathcal{G}^{+})_{+}\in \mathcal{F}$ , it must refute
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$\Gamma\vdash\varphi$ . It follows that $\models_{\mathcal{F}R}$ is a $\mathrm{V}$-consequence. So it remains to show
that $\mathcal{F}\mathcal{R}=$ Fr $\models_{F\mathcal{R}}$ . But this is obtained from (i) by using the results
on duality between general $\mathrm{V}$-frames and $V$-algebras (see [5] for a similar
argument). a
The consequence relations as the extensions of V are complete in the
sense that, for any finite set of formulas $\Gamma$ and formula $\varphi$ , if $\Gamma\forall\varphi$ then
there exists a Kripke frame $\mathcal{F}\in$ Fr $\vdash$ such that $\Gamma\#\tau\varphi$ . In contrast
with superintuitionisitic logics it is almost trivial to construct incomplete
V-consequeces.
Proposition 14 (i) The consequence relation $\models_{\mathcal{G}}$ , where $\mathcal{G}$ is the frame
defined in Example 11, is not complete.
(ii) $\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}+(parrow q)(qarrow p)$ is not complete.
Proof Let $\varphi_{1}=(parrow q)((parrow q)arrow p),$ $\varphi_{2}=(parrow q)(qarrow p)$ .
One can easily show that a Kripke frame validates $\varphi_{1}$ iff it validates $\varphi_{2}$
iff it is linear. However, $\mathcal{G}$ refutes $\varphi_{1}$ but validates $\varphi_{2}$ . The claims of the
proposition follow immediately. $\square$
The class of all $\mathrm{V}$-consequences order by inclusion forms a complete
lattice; we denote it by $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ . There is an isomorphism between $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$
and NExtGrz via $\sigma$ . So we conjecture that there exist an isomorphism
between $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\vdash_{\mathrm{V}}$ and NExtL, for some $L\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{K}4$ . But,
Theorem 15 The lattice of $\mathrm{V}$ -consequences conating $\vdash_{\mathrm{F}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{C}}$ is not iso-
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morphic to the lattice NExtGL.
5. From the semantical point of view, all the “peculiarities” of the
language $\mathcal{L}$ interpretd on thransitive frames as wll as of the logic V and
its extensions we observed in the thress previous sections are explained
by the fact that being in an irrflexive world $x$ ; we can talk about $x$ using
$\wedge \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v};arrow \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ for talking about successors $x$ . A way of improving the
expressiveness power of $\mathcal{L}$ is to add the following one more implication
$arrow \mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}\mathcal{L}$ ;
$x\models\varphi^{\mathrm{c}}arrow\psi$ iff $\forall y\in W((x=yxRy)\wedge y\models\varphi\Rightarrow y\models\psi)$ .
The resulting “biarrow” language is denoted by $\mathcal{L}_{2}$ . But instead of $\mathcal{L}_{2}$ ,
we can consider the modal language $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}arrow$’which results from $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ by re-
$\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}arrow \mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}arrow$. Because, using valuation $\mathcal{V}$ of propositional variables
in $\mathrm{U}\mathrm{p}W,$ $arrow(\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ can be defined via $arrow \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ (respectively, $arrow \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$
T) as follows;
$x\models\varphiarrow\psi$ iff $x\models$ ,
$x\models$ iff $x\models \mathrm{T}arrow\varphi$ .
Before showing about the expressive powers, we introduce a caluculs.
Let $\mathrm{U}$ be the set of $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{-}$ -formulas that are valid in all transitive frames
and let “$\Gamma\vdash_{\mathrm{U}}\varphi$ iff $\forall \mathcal{M}\forall x((\mathcal{M}, x)\models\Gamma\Rightarrow(\mathcal{M}, x)\models\varphi)$” Clearly, the
deduction theorem holds $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\vdash_{\mathrm{U}}$ and $arrow(\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}$ is, “ $\Gamma,$ $\varphi\vdash_{\mathrm{U}}\psi$ iff $\Gamma\vdash_{\mathrm{U}\varphi}arrow$
$\psi$
” ), and it is easy to check $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\vdash_{\mathrm{U}}$ is protoalgebraic.
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$\mathrm{U}$ can be considered as a normal modal logic on the intuitionistic basis.
This observation and completeness results of [10] provide a Hilbert-style
axiomatization for $\mathrm{U}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\vdash_{\mathrm{U}}$.
Theorem 16 The calculus $U$ in the language $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{arrow}with$ modus ponens
and substitution as its inference rules and the axioms
1. those of Int,
2. $\square (parrow q)arrow(\square p^{\mathrm{c}}arrow\square q),$ $arrow\square p,$ $parrow\square p$,
3. $\square parrow(q\vee(qarrow p))$
is strongly complete with respect to the class of transitive frames, $i.e.$ ,
$\mathrm{r}\vdash_{U\varphi}$ iff $\Gamma\vdash_{\mathrm{U}\varphi}$ .
In the proof of theorem 16, to interpret $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{arrow \mathrm{t}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}$ axiomatized by $U$,
we use a notion of $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{M}$-frames from [10]. That is, descriptive IM-frames
$\mathcal{F}=\langle \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{R}_{arrow}, \mathcal{R}, P\rangle$ is a strucutre such that $\langle W, R_{rightarrow}, P\rangle$ is a descriptive
(quasi-ordered) frame for Int($arrow \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ interpreted via $R_{arrow}$ ), $\mathrm{P}$ is closed under
the standard $\square$ interpreted via $R,$ $xRy$ iff $\forall X\in P(x\in\square X\Rightarrow y\in X)$
and $R_{arrow 0}R\mathrm{o}R_{arrow}\rangle$ $=R$ .
Remark. Not every general frame for V can be regarded as an IM-
frame because it is not necessaarily closed under $arrow$ . So, $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{M}$-frames for $\mathrm{U}$
defined in the above will be called $\mathrm{U}$-frames. Since $R_{\mathrm{L}}arrow \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ uniquely deter-
mined $R$ , we may omit $R_{arrow}$ and denote these frames by $\mathcal{F}=\langle W, R, P\rangle$ .
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Now, NExtU of normal extensions of $\mathrm{U}$ , that is sets of $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{rightarrow}$ -formulas
containing $\mathrm{U}$ and closed under MP and Subst (the closure under neces-
sitation is ensured by the axiom $parrow$). Then, immediately,
Theorem 17 Every logic in NExtU is characterized by a class of (de-
scriptive) $\mathrm{U}$ -frames. Conversely, everyl class of general $\mathrm{U}$ -frames deter-
mines a logic in NExtU.
Using the result on embeddings of intuitionisitic modal logics into clas-
sical polymodal logics obtained in [9], [10], we can show that there is
a relationship between NExtU and $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{K}4$ is similar to that between
$\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ and $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{S}4$ discussed in Section 1.
Let $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{2}$ be the language with two necessity operators $\coprod_{I}$ and $\square$ (and
the $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{C}}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}arrow$ ), and let $\mathrm{T}^{\prime;}$ be the translation from $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{arrow}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}_{0}\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{2}$
prefixing
and $L_{2}$ in the unimodal languages $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}2-$ and $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{2^{-\fbox{}}}-$, respectively,
denote by $L_{1}\otimes L_{2}$ their fusion, the smallest bimodal logic in $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{2}$ to con-
tain $L_{1}\cup L_{2}$ . By $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{K}$ we mean the minimal normal intuitionistic modal
logic in the language $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{arrow}(\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.$ , the smallest set of formulas containing
Int, the modal axiom of $\mathrm{K}$ and closed under modus ponens, substitution
and necessitation). As is shown in [9],
(i) the map
$\rho M=\{\varphi\in \mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{-} : \mathrm{T}’’(\varphi)\in M\}$ ,
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is a lattice homomorphism from NExt $(\mathrm{S}4\otimes\kappa)$ onto NExtIntK (preserv-
ing the finite model property and decidability);
(ii) each logic $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{K}\oplus\Gamma$ is embedded by $\mathrm{T}’’$ into any logic. $M$ in the
interval
$(\mathrm{S}4\otimes \mathrm{K})\oplus \mathrm{T}’’(\Gamma)\subseteq M\subseteq(\mathrm{G}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{Z}\otimes \mathrm{K})\oplus \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{x}\oplus \mathrm{T}J/(\Gamma)$ ,
where mix $=\coprod_{I}\coprod$, and
(iii) the map
$\sigma(\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{K}\oplus\Gamma)=(\mathrm{G}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{z}\otimes \mathrm{K})\oplus \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{x}\oplus \mathrm{T}’’(\Gamma)$
is a lattice isomorphism from $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\kappa$ onto NExt $(\mathrm{G}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{z}\otimes \mathrm{K})\oplus \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{x}$.
(As before, the $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\oplus \mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ “take the union and close it under the
postulated inference rules”.)
If we consider now K4 as a bimodal logic in $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{2}$ by defining $=$
$\varphi\wedge\square \varphi$ , then we may assume K4 to be in the class NExt $(\mathrm{s}4\otimes \mathrm{K}4)$ . Since
this “bimodal” K4 is characterized by the class of frames of the form
$\langle W, R^{r}, R\rangle$ and in view of Proposition 21 in [10], $\rho \mathrm{K}4=$ U. Therefore,
$\mathrm{U}$ has the finite model property and $\rho$ is a lattice homomorphism from
$\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{K}4$ onto NExtU. The logic
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{z}’=\mathrm{K}4\oplus\square ($
is known to be determined by the class of finite Kripke frames without
proper (i.e., containing $\geq 2$ points) clusters (see e.g. [1]). $\mathrm{U}$ is char-
acterized by this class too. It follows that $\rho \mathrm{G}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{z}’$ is also U. And since
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mix $\in$ K4 and the “bimodal” Grz’ is in NExt $(\mathrm{G}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{Z}\otimes \mathrm{K}4)$ , we finally
obtain
Theorem 18 The map $\sigma$ is an isomorphism from NExtU onto $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{Z}’$.
It is not hard to see also that modulo clusters the languages $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{-}$ and
$\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ have the same functional power on the class of transitive frames.
Proposition I9 $\{\varphi_{F} : \varphi\in \mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{rightarrow}\}=\{\varphi_{F} : \varphi\in \mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}\}$ , where $\mathcal{F}$ ranges
over the class of all transitive frames.
Proof Similar to the proof of Proposition 1. a
To prove that the languages under consideration have the same ax-
iomatic power we require frame-based $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}arrow$’-formulas simulating canon-
ical formulas for K4 of [11]. Namely, with every finite rooted transitive
frame $\mathcal{F}=\langle W, R\rangle$ without proper clusters–let $a_{0},$ $\ldots$ , $a_{n}$ be all its points
and $a_{0}$ the root–and a set $D$ of antichains in $\mathcal{F}$ we associate a formula
$\gamma(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ which is the implication $(arrow)$ whose consequent is $p_{0}$ and the
antecedent is the conjunction of all formulas of the form
$p_{0}$ if $\neg a_{0}Ra_{0}$ ,
$p_{i}arrow p_{i}$ if $a_{i}Ra_{i}$ ,
$\gamma_{ij}=(\wedge\Gamma_{j}arrow p_{j})arrow p_{i}$ if $a_{i}Ra_{j}$ ,
$\gamma_{\mathrm{d}}$
$= \bigwedge_{a_{j}\in W-\mathrm{r}\underline{\dagger}}(\wedge \mathrm{r}_{j}arrow p_{j})arrow a_{i\in}\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{d}}p_{i}$








$\{p_{k} : a_{k}\not\in a_{j^{\underline{\uparrow}}}\}$ if $a_{j}Ra_{j}$
$\{$ if $\neg a_{j}Ra_{j}$ ,
$X\uparrow=\{y\in W : \exists x\in XxRy\},$ $X\underline{\uparrow}=X\cup X\uparrow$ ,
$X\downarrow=\{y\in W : \exists x\in XyRx\},$ $X\overline{\downarrow}=X\cup X\downarrow$ .
Given a frame $\mathcal{G}=\langle V, S\rangle$ , a partial map $f$ from $V$ onto $W$ is called a
subreduction of $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{F}$ if, for all $x,$ $y\in \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}f$ ,
(R1) $xSy$ implies $f(x)Rf(y)$ ;
(R2) $f(x)Rf(y)$ implies $\exists z\in x\uparrow f(z)=f(y)$ .
A subreduction $f$ is said to be cofinal if dom$f\uparrow\subseteq \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}f\overline{\downarrow}$ .
Proposition 20 For any transitive frame $\mathcal{G}=\langle \mathcal{V}, S\rangle,$ $\mathcal{G}\#\gamma(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ iff
there is a cofinal subreduction of $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{F}$ satisfying the following (closed
domain) condition
(CDC) $\neg\exists x\in \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}}f\uparrow$ -dom$f\exists \mathrm{d}\in Df(x\uparrow)=\mathrm{d}\underline{\uparrow}$ .
Proof $(\Rightarrow)$ Suppose $\mathcal{G}$ refutes $\gamma(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ under some valuation (in $\mathrm{U}\mathrm{p}V$)
and $\pi$ is the premise of $\gamma(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ . Define a partial map from $V$ onto $W$
by taking, for $x\in V$ ,
$f(x)=\{$
$a_{i}$ if $x\# p_{i},$ $x\models\Gamma_{i},$ $x\models\pi$
undefined otherwise
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and show that it is a cofinal subreduction of $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{F}$ satisfying (CDC).
Notice first that $f$ is a partial function. Indeed, since $\mathcal{F}$ contains no
proper clusters, if $a_{i}\neq a_{j}$ then either $\neg a_{i}Ra_{j}$ or $\neg a_{j}Ra_{i}$ ; in the former
case $p_{j}\in\Gamma_{i}$ and in the latter $p_{i}\in\Gamma_{j}$ .
Let $xSy,$ $f(x)=a_{i}$ and $f(y)=a_{j}$ . Then (since the valuation is intu-
itionistic) $x\# p_{j}$ from which $p_{j}\not\in\Gamma_{i}$ and so $a_{j}\in a_{i}\underline{\uparrow}$ , i.e., either $a_{i}Ra_{j}$ or
$a_{i}=a_{j}$ . Now, if $a_{i}=a_{j}$ and $\neg a_{i}Ra_{i}$ then $\square p_{i}\in\Gamma_{i}$ , so $x\models$ and $y\models p_{i}$ ,
which is a contradiction. Thus, $f$ satisfies (R1). To show that it satisfies
(R2) suppose $f(x)=a_{i}$ and $a_{i}Ra_{j}$ . If $a_{i}\neq a_{j}$ then $x\# p_{i},$ $x\models\gamma_{ij}$ , and
so there is $y\in x\uparrow$ such that $y\models\Gamma_{j}$ and $y\# p_{j}$ , i.e., $f(y)=a_{j}$ . And if
$a_{i}=a_{j}$ then, since $x\# p_{i}$ and $x\models\square p_{i}arrow p_{i}$ , we have $x\#\square p_{i}$ , i.e., there
is $y\in x\uparrow$ such that $y\# p_{i}$ , and again $f(y)=a_{i}$ .
Since, by the definition, $f(x)=a_{0}$ whenever $x\#\gamma(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ , the map
$f$ is a surjection. The fact that $f$ is cofinal is clearly ensured by the
conjunct $\gamma_{\perp}$ and that it satisfies (CDC) by $\gamma_{\lceil}$ .
$(\Leftarrow)$ Let $f$ be a cofinal subreduction of $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{F}$ satisfying (CDC). Define
a valuation in $\mathcal{G}$ by taking
$x\models p_{i}$ iff $x\not\in f^{-1}(ai)\overline{1}$.
By a straightforward inspection one can easily verify that under this val-
uation $x\#\gamma(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ for every $x\in f^{-1}(a\mathrm{o})$ . a
Corollary 21 For every Kripke frame $\mathcal{G}$ , every finite rooted frame $\mathcal{F}$
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without proper clusters and every set $D$ of antichains in $\mathcal{F}$ ,
$\mathcal{G}\#\alpha(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ iff $\mathcal{G}\#\gamma(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ .
Proof Follows from Proposition 20 and the refutability criterion for
canonical formulas in [11].
Remark. Actually, it is not hard to show that Proposition 20 holds for
any general $\mathrm{U}$-frame $\mathcal{G}$ . It follows that the formulas of the form $\gamma(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}, \perp)$
are enough to axiomatize all logics in NExtU.
Proposition 22 A skeleton-closed class $C$ of transitive frames is $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{rightarrow-}$
axiomatic iff it is $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ -axiomatic.
Proof If $C$ is axiomatized by a set $\Gamma$ of $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{rightarrow}$ -formulas then it is also
axiomatizable by the set $\mathrm{T}^{;/}(\Gamma)$ . Suppose now that $L$ is the logic in
$M\mathcal{L}$ characterized by $C$ . Since $C$ is skeleton-closed, it is axiomatizable
by a set $\Gamma$ of canonical formulas for K4 built on frames without proper
clusters. The logic $\rho L\in$ NExtU is also characterized by $C$ . It follows
that $\gamma(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)\in\rho \mathcal{L}$ whenever $\alpha(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)\in$ F. Now, if $\mathcal{G}\not\in C$ then
$\mathcal{G}\#\alpha(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)$ , for some $\alpha(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)\in\Gamma$ and so $\mathcal{G}\#\gamma(F, D, \perp)$ . Thus,
$C$ is axiomatized by $\rho L$ (or by the $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}_{-}$-formulas $\gamma(F, D, \perp)$ such that
$\alpha(\mathcal{F}, D, \perp)\in\Gamma)$ .
As we saw in Section 2, not all $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$-definable skeleton-closed classes
of transitive frames are $\mathcal{L}$-definable. The situation changes drastically,
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however, when we consider frame classes definable by rules. Call a class
of general $\mathrm{V}$-frames $\mathcal{L}$-rule definable if it is of the form $\mathrm{F}\mathrm{r}\vdash$ , for some V-
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\vdash$ . A class of transitive Kripke frames is $\mathcal{L}$-rule definable if it
coincides with the subclass of all Kripke frames in some $\mathcal{L}$-rule definable
class of general V-frames.
Theorem 23 (i) Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{L}_{2^{\neg}}definable$ class of general U-frames.
Then there exists an $\mathcal{L}$ -rule definable class $C’$ of general $\mathrm{V}$ -frames such
that $C$ coincides with the subclass of all $\mathrm{U}$ -frames in $C’$ .
(ii) A class of Kripke frames is $\mathcal{L}_{2}$ -definable iff it is $\mathcal{L}$ -rule definable.
Proof Clearly, (ii) follows from (i), and to prove (i) it suffices to show
that for any $\mathcal{L}_{2}$-definable class of descriptive $\mathrm{U}$-frames, there exists an
$\mathcal{L}$-rule definable class $C’$ of descriptive $\mathrm{V}$-frames such that $C$ consists of
precisely the $\mathrm{U}$-frames in $C’$ (for a $\mathrm{V}$-frame $\mathcal{F}$ is a $\mathrm{U}$-frame iff $(\mathcal{F}^{+})_{+}$ is
a $U$-frame). To this end c.onsider the variety $\mathcal{V}$ of $\mathrm{V}$-algebras generated
by $C^{+}=\{\mathcal{F}^{+} : F\in C\}$ . $\mathcal{V}=HSPC^{+}$ , where $H$ denotes the operation of
taking homomorphic images, $S$ the operation of taking subalgebras, and
$P$ the operation of forming direct products. It is enough to show that
for any $A\in \mathcal{V}$ such that $A_{+}$ is a $\mathrm{U}$-frame, we have $A_{+}\in C$ . Suppose
that $A\in HSPC^{+}$ and $A_{+}$ is a $\mathrm{U}$-frame. Then $A\in HSC^{+}$ , since $C^{+}$
is closed under products. By the fact that there are descriptive frames
$\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ such that $\mathcal{G}\in C,$ $A_{+}$ is a generated subframe of $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ is
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reducible to $\mathcal{H}$ by some $f$ . For a frame $F=\langle W, R, P\rangle$ , denote by $P^{b}$
the smallest set of cones containing $P$ and such that $\mathcal{F}^{b}=\langle W, R, P^{b}\rangle$ is
a $\mathrm{U}$-frame. In other words, $P^{b}$ is the closure of $P$ under the operations
$arrow,$ $arrow,$
$\cap \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ U. One can easily show that $\mathcal{H}^{b}$ is a reduct of $\mathcal{G}^{b}=\mathcal{G}$
(since $f^{-1}(x\mathrm{Y})=f^{-1}(X)f^{-1}(\mathrm{Y})$ , for $\in\{arrow,$ $arrow,$ $\cap,$ $\cup\}$ ) and that
$A_{+}=(A_{+})^{b}$ is a generated subframe of $\mathcal{H}^{b}$ . And since $C$ is closed under
generated subframes, which are $\mathrm{U}$-frames, and reducts, which are also
$\mathrm{U}$-frames, we finally obtain $A_{+}\in C$ . $\mathrm{Q}$
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